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■WILL ROBOTS TAKE 
YOUR JOB? A LOOK AT 
VIRGINIA’S
OPPORTUNITIES AND 
VULNERABILITIES
It’s not about the skill level or how much 
education you have. Really, the primary 
question is, is the job on some level routine, 
repetitive and predictable? 
–  Martin Ford, “Rise of the Robots” 
(Basic Books, 2015)
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t’s not often that a study generated by two 
Oxford academics creates as much hubbub 
as did a 2013 examination that focused on 
which U.S. occupations are at “high risk” of 
being automated within the next 20 years. Carl 
Benedikt Frey, an economist, and Michael A. 
Osborne, an engineer, led the Oxford automation 
study,1 which concluded that 47 percent of 
total employment in 702 occupations in the 
United States should be considered to be in the 
“high risk” category relative to the potential of 
automation to destroy these jobs. “Automation” 
here refers broadly to the substitution by 
employers of machines, software-guided 
processes and artificial intelligence (AI) for 
workers.
Virtually everyone knows about mechanical 
dishwashers replacing human dishwashers and 
one can easily visualize a single giant combine 
harvester replacing dozens of farmworkers 
wielding scythes. Less obvious perhaps has been 
the accelerating automation of the financial 
services industry, where giants such as Goldman 
Sachs are using software programs instead 
of highly paid associates to conduct and write 
research, make stock trades, summarize relevant 
news and even communicate with customers. 
Contemplate also the use of sensors rather than 
people to pick out microcircuits or even heads of 
lettuce that are of inferior quality and therefore 
should be discarded. Or, consider that a computer 
now can defeat the best human chess player and 
an AI program developed by Google “learned” on 
1   Carl Benedikt Frey and Michael A. Osborne, “The Future of Employment: 
How Susceptible Are Jobs to Automation?” Oxford Martin School, Sept. 
17, 2013. www.oxfordmartin.ox.ac.uk/downloads/academic/The_Future_of_
Employment.pdf.
Data presented in this chapter relate either to the U.S. or Virginia. 
What about Virginia metropolitan regions such as Richmond and 
Roanoke? Bureau of Labor Statistics occupational data that focus 
on mid-sized regions are much more variable than statewide data 
and, in some cases, simply not available. Presentation of these data 
might lead to unjustified conclusions. Hence, we do not offer any 
regional data, though some are available.
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its own how to beat the reigning world champion at Go, the exceedingly 
complex 2,500-year-old strategy game.
An increasing number of McDonald’s restaurants now have computer 
screens that take your order – rendering unnecessary some of the 
workers formerly behind the counter. No minimum-wage law applies 
to the computer screens. In the realm of higher education, the advent 
of new distance-learning tools and the rise of “MOOCs” (massive open 
online courses) are disrupting the centuries-old “sage on the stage” model 
that emphasizes professors lecturing to groups of more or less interested 
students arrayed in front of them.
Highest on the risk list are occupations that include telemarketers, 
tax preparers, library technicians, etchers and engravers, and bank 
tellers. Frey and Osborne argue that up to 87 percent of jobs in the 
accommodation and food services sector are at risk, as are up to 54 
percent of jobs in finance and insurance. Lowest on their risk list are 
occupations such as elementary school teachers, doctors and dentists, 
nurses, many health care workers, plumbers, theatrical makeup artists 
and foresters.
The Common Denominator
What determines whether the jobs of workers in some occupations (say, 
secretaries and legal researchers) are at high risk, while the jobs of 
workers in other occupations (nurses and plumbers) are not? The key is 
not necessarily the level of education required for each job, though this 
may play a role. Instead, the overriding deciding factor is the extent 
to which jobs require creative and social intelligence, perception, 
interpretation and the ability to manipulate as opposed to being 
dominated by repetitive, routine tasks capable of being learned by 
machines fueled by artificial intelligence.  
Some analysts believe that Frey and Osborne’s estimates are 
substantially too high. A 2016 Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) study takes issue with their methodology 
and argues that it isn’t all workers in an occupation that are at risk, but 
rather specific jobs within occupations. Thus, some workers at financial 
firms can readily be supplanted by trading algorithms incorporated 
into software, while others cannot be replaced because of their 
personal relationships with specific firms and customers. The OECD 
study concludes that only 9 percent of all jobs are at risk because of 
automation (Melanie Arntz, Terry Gregory and Ulrich Zierahn, “The Risk 
of Automation for Jobs in OECD Countries,” www.oecd-ilibrary.org, May 
2016). A July 2016 study produced by McKinsey analysts Michael Chui, 
James Manyika and Mehdi Miremadi (“Where Machines Could Replace 
Humans — and Where They Can’t (Yet),” www.mckinsey.com/business-
functions/business-technology/our-insights/where-machines-could-
replace-humans-and-where-they-cant-yet?cid=other-eml-alt-mkq-mck-
oth-1607), concluded that 60 percent of all occupations in the United 
States could see 30 percent or more of their work activities being 
automated.
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Note that job recovery in the United States (and Virginia) from the 
Great Recession of 2008 has been built upon relatively low-skill service 
jobs that pay relatively low wages. It is often these jobs that Frey and 
Osborne argue are most at risk because of automation. The reason is 
that they involve repetitive tasks that can be programmed into a machine 
or computer. Further, the machine frequently can complete those tasks 
with a higher level of quality and do so at a lower per-unit cost than their 
human counterpart. Think about the computer screen that is taking the 
place of behind-the-counter personnel at Panera Bread.  
The reality is that computerization of jobs no longer is confined to 
traditional assembly-line, mass-production industries. However, it 
also is true that some manual labor tasks require physical adaptability 
and flexibility in approach. Hence, workers doing these tasks are more 
resistant to automation than those in other jobs that often require more 
education, but nevertheless can be imitated by “smart” machines.
It is the exercise of reasoning, judgment and creative abilities plus the 
application of social interaction skills that most frequently cause a job to 
fall into the low automation risk category rather than high risk. One does 
not need a bachelor’s degree to become an electrician or a plumber (both 
low-risk occupations). Nevertheless, electricians, automobile mechanics 
and plumbers must be able to assess, interpret, adjust, reason and create 
when inserted into unpredictable situations. “You never know what kinds 
of wiring and connections you’re going to find in an old house,” a veteran 
electrician told us. Some variant of this observation, however, might be 
applied to nurses, engineers and multimedia artists. On-the-job experience 
often assumes great value in such positions because it provides workers 
with a set of proficiencies that enables them to exercise sound judgment in 
situations that seldom are repetitive.  
On the other hand, the tasks confronting a telephone operator, shipping 
clerk or Las Vegas gaming employee tend to be repetitive and frequently 
can be replaced by a smart machine. True, these jobs usually require less 
formal education than those in low-risk occupations. However, it is not 
education per se that makes the difference here, but rather the presence 
or absence of repetitive tasks, reasoning and creativity.  
The principle is straightforward: Repetitive, predictable tasks are 
susceptible to machine learning and the application of artificial 
intelligence. Thus, college professors, despite their Ph.Ds., may indeed 
find some of their number being replaced by learner-driven technology 
that is capable of doing what they do, but at a reduced cost. Ironically, 
the learner-driven technologies with access to abundant data and feedback 
may actually be more sensitive than the typical college professor is to 
the peculiar geographic locations, job and family situations, and learning 
preferences of individual students.  
Contrast college professors to elementary school teachers, very few of 
whom hold a doctorate. These teachers cannot be replaced by a machine 
because of their need to exercise judgment, interpret what is going 
on in their sometimes unpredictable classrooms, develop individually 
focused plans of action on the fly, and use their social skills to deal with 
impressionable and sometimes delicate young people. Elementary school 
teachers are among the least at-risk workers in society today.  
What The Studies Say 
(And Do Not Say)
Neither Frey and Osborne, nor the OECD or McKinsey Global 
Institute, are rigid determinists. They speak in terms of probabilities 
(“susceptibilities”) rather than certainties. The future they paint is a 
plausible one, yet not one that is inevitable. Why?  Because technological 
change and changing prices may alter the world they have addressed. 
Consider the following situations.  
•  Think of a new machine that is capable of performing many of the tasks 
of a software engineer; however, this machine is prohibitively expensive 
and hence what is feasible is not economic.  
•  Further, even when a machine is capable of performing a task 
inexpensively, there may be a visible gap between the machine doing that 
task inexpensively and doing it well. Consider automated checkout lines 
at supermarkets and automated check-in lines at airports. Intelligent 
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machine innovations such as these reduce supplier costs, but clearly can 
be the source of customer frustration and delays.    
•  The use of “big data” has the potential to diminish the need for human 
judgment and interpretation that currently cause some jobs to be 
resistant to automation. A range of cognitive tasks could be susceptible 
to machine learning and recognition if their development is based upon 
large data sets that are capable of recognizing patterns and therefore 
can capture the key aspects of human choice and behavior. Just as big 
data enable Amazon to suggest books that customers might like based 
on their internet behavior, these data sets also might inform activities 
ranging from selling automobiles, houses and tickets to serving legal 
clients and responding to calls for law enforcement.   
•  None of the studies directly addresses the distinction that some 
economists currently make between “tradable” versus “non-tradable” 
goods. Tradable goods are those that are sold internationally in 
competitive markets, for example, cellphones. In tradable markets, 
automobile workers in one country (say, the U.S.) can lose their jobs 
to automobile workers in another country (say, China) because of 
international competition. By contrast, goods and services in non-
tradable markets are not subject to international competition. A 
hairstylist in Harrisonburg isn’t in competition with a hairstylist in 
Beijing. Even so, things can change. Consider that tax preparation used 
to be a predominantly local industry – relatively few customers went 
outside of their hometowns to get their tax returns completed. However, 
because of automation, a tax preparer in Danville now can lose her job 
to tax preparers in New York City or Beijing who are using software 
and internet connections that enable them to prepare tax returns 
for residents in Southwest Virginia. The point is easily understood: 
Automation converts some goods and services from tradable to non-
tradable and this can result in the loss or shuffling of jobs. This trend is 
likely to continue as software driven by artificial intelligence makes it 
possible for items such as tax forms to be completed anywhere.   
•  Frey and Osborne point out that many of the people who will lose their 
jobs as a result of automation are among those in society least able to 
cope with such disruptions due to background, education and lack of 
mobility. It seems likely, therefore, that the impact of automation will be 
felt unevenly across income classes.  
•  The analysts do not directly discuss current proposals, such as a $15 
per hour minimum wage, but economic analysis predicts that such a 
law would provide an additional incentive for employers to accelerate 
the adoption of laborsaving automation. The salient questions are 
whether the nature of their production processes, their specific collective 
bargaining agreements and the law actually give them the flexibility 
to do so. The answers clearly differ across industries and even inside 
industries.     
None of the analysts should be regarded as champions of the world they 
foresee. They are impartial reporters of the facts as they view them. Still, 
they note that the demise of high-risk jobs will increase unemployment 
at least in the short run and likely increase economic inequality as well 
unless society provides financial incentives and invests in job retraining 
programs designed to ease the flow of people from the high-risk 
occupations where jobs are being lost, to low-risk occupations where 
the number of jobs is increasing. Of course, this may be easier said than 
done. How does one teach creative and social skills, how to interpret and 
make judgments, and how to adjust to the unexpected to people who may 
have lower than average intellectual abilities and who for decades have 
been performing repetitive tasks? How does one convince an unemployed 
steelworker with a family and a mortgage that he or she should move 
from West Virginia to Texas? Frey and Osborne are straightforward: “For 
workers to win the race, however, they will have to acquire creative and 
social skills.” This is important advice, given that McKinsey suggested in 
2013 that sophisticated algorithms could substitute for approximately 140 
million full-time knowledge workers worldwide.2  
2   McKinsey Global Institute, “Disruptive Technologies: Advances That Will Transform Life, Business and the 
Global Economy.” 
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The National Picture
For the United States as a whole, Frey and Osborne estimate that 47 
percent of all nonfarm jobs fall into their “high risk” category in terms 
of being eliminated because of automation. In April 2016, this would have 
translated to 67.64 million nonfarm jobs – a staggering number.3 However, 
even if Frey and Osborne’s estimates are precisely on the mark, it does 
not follow that these losses will occur immediately. Multiple decades 
sometimes are required for industries to adjust to new realities. Witness 
the slow deterioration of output levels and jobs in the coal, textile and 
tobacco industries in Virginia.  
Graph 1 reports the five broad occupational categories that Frey and 
Osborne estimated have the greatest vulnerability to job losses because 
of technological change, plus the five broad occupations with the least 
susceptibility.  
The McKinsey study approaches the job vulnerability question through a 
somewhat different lens by focusing on 2,000 different work activities in 
more than 800 occupations. Similar to the OECD, McKinsey argues that 
individual occupations are distinctive in requiring a variety of different 
work activities, which might include physical movement, processing 
data, interacting with customers and the like. These work activities have 
varying potential for automation. The McKinsey study provides estimates 
of the portion of time during each workweek that a typical worker spends 
on each specific work activity. Graph 2 reports the estimates of the 
percentage of time during a typical workweek that workers in the United 
States spend on various work activities. From left to right, these range 
from the work activities least susceptible to automation (such as managing 
others) to those most susceptible to automation (predictable physical 
work).  
3  This is a seasonally adjusted number and includes government employees.
Where physical work is concerned, it is the predictability of the motions 
involved with that work that is the key to the susceptibility of a particular 
occupation to automation. McKinsey concluded that 78 percent of jobs 
involving predictable physical work (welding, food preparation and 
packaging of products) are prone to be automated, whereas only 25 
percent of jobs involving less predictable physical work (construction, 
forestry and raising outdoor animals) are vulnerable. Using the same 
analysis, McKinsey concluded that 47 percent of a retail salesperson’s 
activities have the technical potential to be automated, but fully 86 percent 
of the jobs of the retail sector’s bookkeepers, accountants and auditing 
clerks are in jeopardy. McKinsey reported these estimates in detail in a 
2015 study.4 The consulting group concluded that 45 percent of all work 
activities could be automated using already available technologies, but only 
5 percent of all occupations (the Frey and Osborne focus indicator).  
The McKinsey analysts also estimated that more than 20 percent of a 
typical CEO’s working time could be automated using currently available 
technologies. The analysts concluded that several lower-paid occupations, 
such as health aides, landscapers and maintenance workers, faced fewer 
risks associated with automation because the work of the individuals in 
these occupations could not easily be replaced by a machine or replicated 
by means of AI.  
The consulting group found that the amount of workers’ average hourly 
wages explained only 19 percent of the variability in their automation 
susceptibility. That is, it was the characteristics of specific work tasks 
rather than the monetary value of that work that was the most important 
determinant of whether or not those work tasks were vulnerable to 
automation. High salaries did not guarantee reduced susceptibility to 
automation. Indeed, the opposite may be true – high salaries increase the 
incentive for employers to seek ways to automate.  
4   Michael Chui, James Manyika and Mehdi Miremadi, “Four Fundamentals of Workplace Automation,” 
www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/business-technology/our-insights/four-fundamentals-of-workplace-
automation (November 2015).
Miles Brundage of Slate asks an interesting question: In the future, 
will “made by humans” become a phrase equivalent to “organic” or 
“fair trade”? www.slate.com (Sept. 27, 2013)
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GRAPH 1
THE BROAD OCCUPATIONS MOST (LEAST) SUSCEPTIBLE TO AUTOMATION: 
PERCENT OF JOBS IN FREY AND OSBORNE’S “HIGH RISK” CATEGORY
Source: Carl Benedikt Frey and Michael A. Osborne, “The Future of Employment: How Susceptible Are Jobs to Computerisation?” Oxford University Martin School, Sept. 17, 2013
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GRAPH 2
PERCENT OF TIME SPENT IN VARIOUS WORK ACTIVITIES IN ALL U.S. OCCUPATIONS, 2014
Source: Michael Chui, James Manyika and Mehdi Miremadi (“Where Machines Could Replace Humans – and Where They Can’t (Yet),” www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/business-technology/our-insights/where-machines-could-
replace-humans-and-where-they-cant-yet?cid=other-eml-alt-mkq-mck-oth-1607), July 2016
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The Virginia Picture
Frey and Osborne examined 702 specific occupations as defined by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics and ultimately assigned a probability to each 
occupation that is their estimate of the susceptibility of the jobs in that 
occupation to disappearing because of automation. Let’s begin our analysis 
by applying their technique to 22 broad occupational labor force segments 
in Virginia. Table 1 supplies these data, which apply to 3,682,470 Virginia 
nonfarm workers in 2015 in the Commonwealth.  
It is evident in Table 1 that Frey and Osborne’s methodology suggests 
that 1,877,540 jobs in Virginia are susceptible to automation whereby 
a machine, software or artificial intelligence replaces the worker. This 
is 51 percent of all Virginia jobs (compared to the national average of 
47 percent) and these jobs account for $70.56 billion in annual wages. 
Note that Virginia’s total employment roster is slightly more vulnerable 
to technological change than is true for the United States. This implies 
that Virginia’s workforce has a lower percentage of workers performing 
nonrepetitive tasks that require judgment and on-the-job flexibility.  
That one’s job is susceptible to being lost to technological change does not 
mean that this actually will occur. Not all employers choose to automate, 
or to do it in the same ways. Further, some work tasks that appear to 
be highly repetitive sometimes turn out not to be so at crucial decision 
points in the work process and therefore resist “pattern recognition” – the 
application of artificial intelligence in a manner that adequately imitates 
what a human being would do in a specific situation. A manufacturing 
robot, for example, might be superb at detecting minute differences in 
the size and weight of items being produced, but nevertheless be unable 
to detect emerging differences in smell or color. Human participation and 
intervention still are required in some situations.  
Frey and Osborne are not inerrant savants who can see around 
corners and neither are we. They note that “making predictions about 
technological progress is notoriously difficult” and acknowledge that some 
occupations will experience future tumult from automation that they 
currently do not predict. For example, one should not read the numbers in 
Table 1 to mean that it is a certainty that more than 278,000 jobs relating 
to food preparation absolutely are going to be lost in Virginia. Additionally, 
as noted previously, even if these job losses do occur, decades may be 
required for this to happen.       
In general, we can see in Table 1 that there is a tendency for the 
negative job impacts of technological change to land most heavily on 
the least-educated members of the labor force – but only if their jobs 
involve the repetitive, absence of judgment characteristics mentioned 
previously. The key to surviving automation is not worker education, 
per se, but instead job characteristics involving varied tasks that 
require workers to make judgment calls, on occasion to use their 
intuition and in some cases to work together as a team.     
Note that if the OECD study referenced earlier is correct, then the 
number of Virginia jobs at risk is not 1,877,540, but rather only 327,822 – 
still a large number, but one that would be much more manageable. The 
OECD critique of Frey and Osborne’s work focuses on the variability in 
the occupational circumstances and conditions the OECD believes exist 
inside the 702 occupations that Frey and Osborne analyze. This variability, 
the OECD argues, means that it often is inappropriate to include all jobs 
in an occupation in a category labeled “at risk.”
No doubt some variability in job activities and requirements does 
exist inside conventionally labeled occupations; however, 702 distinct 
occupations is a large number and separate analysis of each occupation 
at this level of detail likely picks up considerable heterogeneity in worker 
tasks. Nonetheless, the OECD analysis underlines that the most expansive 
estimates of the impact of automation on jobs should be inspected carefully 
and probably deflated. Further, even if 47 percent of all jobs in the United 
States are at risk because of automation, it does not follow that the loss of 
these jobs would occur immediately. Decades might be required for such 
an adjustment to occur. The slow, downward employment evolution of the 
automobile, coal and steel industries in the United States illustrates the 
often-gradual nature of occupational and industrial change.       
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TABLE 1
FREY AND OSBORNE’S SUSCEPTIBILITY TO AUTOMATION TECHNIQUE APPLIED TO 22 BROAD JOB CLASSIFICATIONS: VIRGINIA, 2015
BROAD OCCUPATIONAL GROUP
VIRGINIA 
TOTAL 
EMPLOYMENT 
AVERAGE HOURLY 
WAGE
AVERAGE 
ANNUAL INCOME
TOTAL VIRGINIA 
ANNUAL WAGES
PERCENT JOBS 
AT RISK
TOTAL JOBS 
AT RISK
TOTAL ANNUAL WAGES 
AT RISK
Management Occupations      166,610  $  61.79  $    128,530  $    21,414,383,300 13.10% 21,826  $    2,606,680,168 
Business and Financial Operations 
Occupations
     251,780  $  39.24  $      81,620  $    20,550,283,600 43.37% 109,197  $    8,561,241,991 
Computer and Mathematical 
Occupations
     195,140  $  46.52  $      96,750  $    18,879,795,000 13.31% 25,973  $    2,020,223,511 
Architecture and Engineering 
Occupations
       73,790  $  41.31  $      85,930  $      6,340,774,700 21.15% 15,607  $       985,125,516 
Life, Physical and Social Science 
Occupations
       31,160  $  39.76  $      82,700  $      2,576,932,000 19.38% 6,039  $       414,754,154 
Community and Social Service 
Occupations
       50,870  $  22.91  $      47,660  $      2,424,464,200 4.16% 2,116  $          86,907,634 
Legal Occupations        36,050  $  49.75  $    103,480  $      3,730,454,000 27.53% 9,925  $       565,249,295 
Education, Training and Library 
Occupations
     237,250  $  25.93  $      53,930  $    12,794,892,500 11.74% 27,853  $    1,051,500,158 
Arts, Design, Entertainment, Sports 
and Media Occupations
       48,510  $  27.51  $      57,220  $      2,775,742,200 17.85% 8,659  $       531,050,098 
Healthcare Practitioners and Technical 
Occupations
     198,840  $  36.24  $      75,390  $    14,990,547,600 14.30% 28,434  $    1,366,670,286 
Healthcare Support Occupations        85,840  $  14.00  $      29,120  $      2,499,660,800 23.70% 20,344  $       625,569,235 
Protective Service Occupations        99,650  $  21.41  $      44,530  $      4,437,414,500 44.31% 44,155  $    1,604,686,868 
Food Preparation and Serving Related 
Occupations
     318,730  $  11.00  $      22,870  $      7,289,355,100 87.47% 278,793  $    6,239,845,855 
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TABLE 1
FREY AND OSBORNE’S SUSCEPTIBILITY TO AUTOMATION TECHNIQUE APPLIED TO 22 BROAD JOB CLASSIFICATIONS: VIRGINIA, 2015
BROAD OCCUPATIONAL GROUP
VIRGINIA 
TOTAL 
EMPLOYMENT 
AVERAGE HOURLY 
WAGE
AVERAGE 
ANNUAL INCOME
TOTAL VIRGINIA 
ANNUAL WAGES
PERCENT JOBS 
AT RISK
TOTAL JOBS 
AT RISK
TOTAL ANNUAL WAGES 
AT RISK
Building and Grounds Cleaning and 
Maintenance Occupations
     124,970  $  12.21  $      25,400  $      3,174,238,000 74.02% 92,503  $    2,369,839,041 
Personal Care and Service Occupations      119,900  $  12.47  $      25,930  $      3,109,007,000 41.06% 49,231  $    1,057,000,959 
Sales and Related Occupations      392,330  $  18.61  $      38,710  $    15,187,094,300 76.13% 298,681  $    9,298,746,336 
Office and Administrative Support 
Occupations
     549,560  $  17.58  $      36,570  $    20,097,409,200 76.83% 422,227  $  14,749,877,695 
Farming, Fishing and Forestry 
Occupations
         6,380  $  15.77  $      32,800  $         209,264,000 41.54% 2,650  $       100,689,765 
Construction and Extraction 
Occupations
     156,160  $  20.36  $      42,360  $      6,614,937,600 61.58% 96,163  $    3,743,489,693 
Installation, Maintenance and Repair 
Occupations
     144,650  $  22.65  $      47,110  $      6,814,461,500 56.94% 82,364  $    3,649,015,736 
Production Occupations      171,550  $  17.51  $      36,420  $      6,247,851,000 73.82% 126,638  $    4,328,941,847 
Transportation and Material Moving 
Occupations
     222,750  $  17.41  $      36,220  $      8,068,005,000 63.05% 108,162  $    4,606,862,311 
Totals  3,682,470  $  190,226,967,100 50.99% 1,877,540  $  70,563,968,152
Source: May 2015 Occupational Employment Statistics (OES) data are available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, www.bls.gov/oes/tables.htm. The May 2015 area level estimates are the first OES estimates to use the 2010 
metropolitan statistical area definitions.
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Is Technological Change 
(And Job Churning) 
Speeding Up?
Is the job-churning process identified by Frey and Osborne going to 
accelerate? That is the trillion-dollar question. It’s true that nearly 
everywhere we look, there is evidence of technological change: self-
driving automobiles and intelligent tractors, smartphones with amazing 
capabilities, potent new drugs, cloud computing, disease-resistant crops, 
medical therapies tailored to a specific individual’s genetic makeup. The 
list of technological changes is impressively long and some argue that 
this lends credence to futurist Ray Kurzweil’s 2001 prediction: “We won’t 
experience 100 years of progress in the 21st century – it will be more 
like 20,000 years of progress (at today’s rate).”5 The implication is that 
technological change is going to cut a wide swath through global labor 
forces in the coming decades. 
Perhaps, but there are others who point out that for all of the marvelous 
technological innovations that have occurred in recent years, actual 
productivity increases have been disappointingly small. As George Mason 
University economist Tyler Cowen put it, “Silicon Valley has not saved us 
from a productivity slowdown” (The New York Times, March 4, 2016). The 
fundamental economics is simple: If technological innovations do not lead 
to significant increases in productivity, then this seriously diminishes their 
lure. Why invest in equipment, software enhancements or AI unless such 
investments are really going to make a difference?
Graph 3 reports the average annual growth in labor productivity (literally, 
output per worker hour) in the United States over the past 20 years. One 
can see that since 2009, labor productivity growth has stalled and now 
is clearly on a lower trend line than it was in the previous decade. This 
5   http://www.kurzweilai.net/the-law-of-accelerating-returns. Kurzweil and others speak of “singularity,” a 
situation in which technological change has become so rapid and so profound that it disrupts, perhaps 
even destroys, human life as we know it. In this view, technological change is a double-edged sword that 
simultaneously generates benefits, such as longer life spans and reduced physical drudgery, even while 
it introduces significant new dangers that range from the obvious (nuclear bombs) to less-obvious AI 
innovations and nanobots that are controlled by unscrupulous forces, perhaps even other, nonhuman AI 
software. 
reduces the incentive for decision makers to invest in new technologies 
that hold little promise of improving the firm’s bottom line.    
Economic data leave little doubt that there has been a slowdown in 
productivity growth that actually dates back to about 1970. Some label 
this “secular stagnation,” but whatever its label, it has afflicted nearly 
all mature Western economies that have not been sitting on substantial 
oil deposits. Some highly reputable analysts, such as Northwestern 
University’s Robert Gordon, argue that recent decades have been 
characterized by a dearth of truly consequential, cost-reducing, 
production-increasing innovations (“The Rise and Fall of American 
Growth,” Princeton University Press, 2015).  
Nevertheless, even if productivity were not declining, reality is that 
a significant proportion of recent innovations have been labor-saving 
in nature – apparent advances that cause firms and organizations to 
substitute machines and AI for people. Consider that in 2015, the United 
States produced 21.3 percent more manufactured output, but accomplished 
this with 16 percent fewer workers than in 2001.6 Further, this and similar 
episodes of automation often generate ripples of change throughout the 
economy. As self-driving cars and trucks move into the mainstream, the 
jobs of mechanics, insurance agents, car salespersons and repair shop 
workers will be disrupted, and some of them no doubt will lose their jobs.     
In the long run, society as a whole emerges better off and enjoys a 
higher standard of living when such developments occur because these 
innovations free up workers who subsequently can be employed doing 
other things. Remember that in 1800, approximately 90 percent of the 
labor force in the United States was involved in agriculture. Today, 
less than 2 percent of our labor force is so occupied, but that 2 percent 
is marvelously productive. The remaining 98 percent of the labor force 
is employed doing other things that have resulted in dramatic growth 
in our standard of living.7
The short-run story, however, can be painfully different. Workers 
displaced by technological innovations lose their jobs and subsequently 
6   Old Dominion University calculations based upon U.S. Department of Commerce data and the North 
American Industry Classification System (NAICS).
7   In the jargon of economics, such innovations push out society’s production possibilities curve and make it 
possible for society to improve its standard of living.
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may find it difficult to obtain new employment. In some cases, this is 
because they are not qualified for the jobs that are available – they are the 
proverbial square pegs attempting to fit into round holes. Jobs exist for 
welders, but steelworkers who have lost their jobs are not trained to weld.
It is these “susceptible” individuals/workers whose circumstances are 
highlighted by Frey and Osborne. Not only may some of them lose 
their jobs, but also their spell of unemployment could turn out to be 
disappointingly long because they are not qualified to fill available 
job openings. They also could be both emotionally and geographically 
immobile. Or, the economy could be in the midst of recession and 
employers simply don’t need additional workers. Whatever the reason, 
they are the “at risk” employees in today’s economy.
While we sometimes hear alarmist rhetoric about job-destroying new 
technologies, the available data do not really support this interpretation. 
Graph 4 reports the absolute number of job layoffs and discharges by 
month in the United States between 2000 and 2016. Immediately visible 
is the upward spike in layoffs and discharges produced by the Great 
Recession. Other than this, since 2011, monthly levels of layoffs and 
discharges in the United States now are lower than they were at the 
turn of the century. It’s not clear that changes in technology, whether 
accelerating or not, have resulted in huge numbers of displaced workers 
who have lost their jobs to machines, software or AI.  
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GRAPH 3
ANNUAL PERCENT GROWTH IN LABOR PRODUCTIVITY (OUTPUT PER HOUR) IN THE UNITED STATES, 1996-2015
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Series ID PRS85006092 3 
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GRAPH 4
NUMBER OF JOB LAYOFFS AND DISCHARGES BY MONTH: UNITED STATES, 2000-2016
Source: FRED database, https://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/JTSLDL. Data are seasonally adjusted.
Graph 4 
Number of Job Layoffs 
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Implications
When technological change occurs, it often results in some workers 
losing their jobs and increased levels of economic inequality. Predictably, 
labor unions and worker advocates (some political) often resist such 
adjustments and demand that generous benefits be paid to those affected 
and that extensive job retraining programs and educational alternatives 
be offered at very low personal cost to each displaced worker. Similar 
arguments are made when freely flowing international trade causes 
workers to lose their jobs. One can make a credible equity case for 
supplying such benefits and programs to displaced workers even though 
the available economic evidence discourages the notion that there are 
conspicuous skill shortages (even in STEM-related occupations)8 in 
American labor markets and the rates of return realized by governments 
that finance job retraining programs often are mediocre.      
A dynamic, growing economy requires willingness on the part of firms 
and organizations (including governments) to accept and implement 
cost-effective new methods of production and service. In response, wise 
public policies in this arena should focus on “riding the wave” of 
technological change rather than encouraging resistance movements 
that are destined to prove futile. Astutely constructed public-private 
partnerships between governments and firms have the potential to 
develop programs designed to compensate and redirect job losers, who 
in many cases are relatively innocent victims of dynamic economic 
forces well beyond their control.    
Three classes of programs commend themselves. These involve 
increasing the skills, flexibility and mobility of the workforce. With 
respect to skills, policy focus should be upon proficiencies that count in 
modern labor markets. This is not the same thing as generating massive 
numbers of additional bachelor’s degree holders, or STEM-degree holders, 
though many elected officials make this a high priority. To the surprise 
of many casual observers, there is relatively little rigorous economic 
evidence available that a significant shortage of job candidates exists 
in STEM-related occupations. Examples of skills currently in demand 
8   See Peter H. Cappelli, “Skills Gaps, Skill Shortages, and Skill Mismatches: Evidence and Arguments for the 
United States,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 68 (March 2015), 251-90.
include computer coding, welding and a wide variety of tasks associated 
with health care. The recent emphasis on “credentialing” may provide a 
means for individuals to upgrade their qualifications and abilities without 
committing themselves to entire academic degree programs.
With respect to flexibility, wherever possible, education and training 
should emphasize suppleness in thinking and approach, rather than 
rote memory. As Fareed Zakaria of The Washington Post (March 26, 
2015) put it so succinctly, “Critical thinking is, in the end, the only way 
to protect American jobs.” Occupational shortages come and go, often 
in unpredictable sequences. Workers now stay with the same employer 
for a median of only 4.6 years.9 The days of virtually guaranteed, steady 
employment with the same firm are all but gone. Like it or not, flexibility 
on the part of both employers and employees is the key to success.
With respect to mobility, wise public policy will reduce barriers that 
discourage people from moving geographically and/or telecommuting to 
jobs that may be located thousands of miles away.    
Relatively little in this domain will occur either easily or without 
controversy; witness recent discussions surrounding disrupters Uber 
and Lyft. What the available empirical evidence does tell us, however, 
is that the current range of public policies is insufficient to deal with 
the occupational ferment that Frey and Osborne have identified. We are 
forewarned.
9  Bureau of Labor Statistics, www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/tenure.pdf.
